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Abstract. Joint encryption-encoding schemes have been released to ful-
fill both reliability and security desires in a single step. Using Low Den-
sity Parity Check (LDPC) codes in joint encryption-encoding schemes,
as an alternative to classical linear codes, would shorten the key size as
well as improving error correction capability. In this article, we present a
joint encryption-encoding scheme using Quasi Cyclic-Low Density Parity
Check (QC-LDPC) codes based on finite geometry. We observed that our
proposed scheme not only outperforms its predecessors in key size and
transmission rate, but also remains secure against all known cryptanaly-
ses of code-based secret key cryptosystems. We subsequently show that
our scheme benefits from low computational complexity. In our proposed
joint encryption-encoding scheme, by taking the advantage of QC-LDPC
codes based on finite geometries, the key size decreases to 1/5 of that of
the so far best similar system. In addition, using our proposed scheme
a wide range of desirable transmission rates are achievable. This vari-
ety of codes makes our cryptosystem suitable for a number of different
communication and cryptographic standards.
Keywords: Joint encryption-encoding · secure channel coding · QC-
LDPC · code-based cryptography · finite geometry.
1 Introduction
The first code-based cryptosystem has been introduced by McEliece [1]. The
security of this cryptosystem is based on the general decoding problem, which
is known to be NP-complete problem [2]. Although at the time of writing this
paper, no algorithm running on quantum computers has been published to break
the code-based cryptosystems, its large key size and low transmission rate in
comparison with the prevalent cryptosystems such as RSA and ElGamal made
these cryptosystems unusable from implementation and standard perspectives.
⋆ This work was partially supported by Iran National Science Foundation (INSF)
under contract No. 92.32575.
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After McEliece published his public key code-based cryptosystem [2], Rao
in 1984 proposed a secret key cryptosystem based on the McEliece public key
cryptosystem [3]. In 1986, Rao and Nam made a security modification [4]. In
1987, Struik and Tilburg pointed out some weaknesses of the Rao-Nam cryp-
tosystem and proposed an improved version [5]. In 2000, a secret key code-based
cryptosystem with much shorter key was introduced [6].
In conventional communication systems the encryption and encoding is be-
ing performed separately and in series. In 2008, a joint encryption-encoding
scheme has been proposed with lower complexity in comparison with separate
encryption and encoding has been proposed [7]. This scheme, using quasi-cyclic
structure, succeeded in shortening the key size. Moreover, it gains benefits from
the fast decoding algorithms and superior error performance of the LDPC codes.
In 2012, another scheme using QC-LDPC codes based on Extended Difference
Families (EDF) was proposed [8], which could not achieve further improvement
on the key size. In 2014, a joint encryption-encoding scheme with the novel
idea of puncturing, instead of adding a perturbation vector, was introduced [9].
Then, in 2015, Esmaeili and Gulliver added random insertions to improve the
security of their system [10]. In [11], they added an agreed random error vec-
tor to their encryption process. In [12], they used random interleaving instead
of random insertions and deletions. The cryptosystem in [11,12] is an encoding
then encryption system rather than a joint encryption-encoding scheme. Be-
sides, it is shown that the use of two pairs of LFSRs has made Esmaeili-Gulliver
cryptosystem vulnerable against ciphertext-only attack [13]. A recent work on
joint encryption-encoding, which uses polar codes as generator matrix, claimed
to achieve a relatively smaller key size, higher level of security, and higher code
rate [14].
Although the key sizes of recent schemes reduced considerably in comparison
to the trailblazing code-based studies, the shortest of them is about 13 times
larger than the key size of conventional AES-128. Due to this fact, attaining
a more compact secret key is one of our motivations of this article. Besides
shortening the secret key, increasing the transmission rate, decreasing the com-
putational complexity of algorithm, and efficiently correcting channel errors, as
well as keeping the cryptosystem secure are the most challenging issues in joint
encryption-encoding researches. Solving these issues need a proper family of
codes to be utilized. This code should possess the following characteristics:
– Efficiently decodable
– A family with large cardinality
– Achievable high transmission rate
– Compressible matrices in the secret key
In this paper, we propose a joint encryption-encoding scheme utilizing QC-
LDPC codes based on finite geometry (FG-QC-LDPC) in order to obtain our
goal, which is introducing a practical solution for the above issues. In finite
geometry, every line can be identified through each of two points lying on that.
This property enables shortening the key size to 1/5 of the so far best known
joint encryption-encoding scheme. The wide acceptable range in the parameters
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of our proposed scheme makes it suitable for various applications and different
levels of security. Furthermore, we show that the FG-QC-LDPC joint scheme is
secure against all known cryptanalyses of such schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls some basic
facts about finite geometry and QC-LDPC codes derived from them. Next, the
description of our new joint encryption-encoding scheme using FG-QC-LDPC
codes is given in Section 3. The security and performance including key size,
error performance, and complexity of our scheme are discussed in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We took the advantages of FG-QC-LDPC codes to achieve our designated goals,
namely improving the performance in comparison to the best known systems in
the literature and also keeping the system secure against all known cryptanalyses.
The basic definitions of QC-LDPC codes based on finite geometry is summarized
in this section.
2.1 QC-LDPC
In cryptographic applications, quasi-cyclic LDPC codes allow us to reduce the
key size as well as the complexity in comparison with the general LDPC codes
[15]. The parity check matrix of a QC-LDPC code is represented as follows,
H =


H0,0 . . . H0,n0−1
...
. . .
...
Hr0−1,0 . . . Hr0−1,n0−1

 (1)
where each Hi is a circulant block of size p× p.
There are different families of QC-LDPC codes used in code-based cryptog-
raphy, namely, the Extended Difference Family (EDF) [15,8], and the Random
Difference Family (RDF) [16,17]. In our scheme we propose using finite geom-
etry to construct circulant blocks of the parity check matrix. This helps us to
attain a shorter secret key than which is available in the literature for joint
encryption-encoding schemes.
2.2 Finite Geometry
A finite geometry is composed of finite number of points. In this paper we focus
on two types of finite geometry, namely projective geometry (PG) and Euclidean
geometry (EG). The definitions of this subsection are generally provided from
[18] and [19].
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Euclidean Geometry
Definition 1. (Euclidean geometry). All m-tuples (a0, a1, . . . , am−1) with ai
from GF (q = ps) where p is prime and s is a natural number form a vector space.
This vector space is also known as the finite Euclidean geometry of dimension m
over GF (q), denoted by EG(m, q). Vector additions and scalar multiplications
of these m-tuples are conducted in GF (q).
Definition 2. (point). Each m-tuple a = (a0, a1, . . . , am−1) represents a point
in EG(m, q).
Definition 3. (origin). The all-zero m-tuple 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) is called the ori-
gin.
Definition 4. (line). The set of {a0+ βa|β ∈ GF (q), a 6= 0} is a line, which is
composed of q points.
The number of points in EG(m, q) is equal to the number of all m-tuples i.e.
n = qm. For every two distinct points there exists exactly one line connecting
them. The number of lines intersecting at each point can be obtained by dividing
the number of possible second points of that line by the number of other points
in each line.
γ =
qm − 1
q − 1
(2)
Therefore, the number of lines in the EG(m, q) is as follows,
J = qm−1
qm − 1
q − 1
(3)
Euclidean Geometry Without Origin By omitting the origin and all lines
intersecting at the origin, a new geometry appears which is denoted byEG∗(m, q).
If α is primitive in GF (qm), then αi for 0 ≤ i ≤ qm − 2 represents the
elements of GF (qm). So the incident vector of line F is as given below,
VF = (v0, v1, . . . , vqm−2) (4)
where vi = 1 if the line F intersects at point α
i, otherwise vi = 0.
In this geometry, a circularly shifted incident vector of a line is an incident
vector for another line [19]. This property partitions the set of all lines, Jo, into
Nc,EG∗ cyclic classes;
Nc,EG∗ =
Jo
n
=
qm−1 − 1
q − 1
. (5)
These cyclic classes enable us to generate circulant blocks for parity check
matrices of QC-LDPC codes. All the necessary information of Euclidean geom-
etry is summarized in Table 1.
A Joint Enc-Enc based on FG-QC-LDPC 5
Table 1. Parameters of the Euclidean Geometry
Parameters EG(m,q) EG
∗(m,q)
Field GF (q) GF (q)
Dimension m m
No. of points n = qm n = qm − 1
No. of lines J = qm−1 q
m
−1
q−1
Jo =
(qm−1−1)(qm−1)
q−1
No. of points in each line ρ = q ρ = q
No. of lines intersecting at
each point
γ = q
m
−1
q−1
γ = q
m
−1
q−1
− 1
No. of cyclic classes —– Nc,EG∗ =
Jo
n
= q
m−1
−1
q−1
Projective Geometry Consider the Galois field GF (qm+1) and α, a primitive
element in this field. So α0, α1, . . . , αq
m+1−2 constitute all non-zero elements of
GF (qm+1). Let n = q
m+1−1
q−1 and β = α
n. Then the order of α is q − 1. Now,
0, β0, β1, , βq−2 form the elements of GF (q). Considering the definition of α and
β, all non-zero elements of GF (qm+1) can be partitioned into n disjoint subsets
as shown below,
(α0) , {α0, βα0, β2α0, . . . , βq−2α0}
(α1) , {α1, βα1, β2α1, . . . , βq−2α1}
...
(αn−1) , {αn−1, βαn−1, β2αn−1, . . . , βq−2αn−1} (6)
Each of the above subsets represent a distinct point in projective geometry,
which is denoted by PG(m, q). In this geometry, each line consists of q + 1
points, formed by linear combination of two distinct αj1 and αj2 points;
(η1α
j1 + η2α
j2) ; ηi ∈ GF (q). (7)
The number of lines intersecting at every particular point is γ = n−1q =
qm−1
q−1 ,
which is obtained by dividing the remaining number of points chosen as the
second point of line (= n− 1) by the number of other points in each line (= q).
Let F = (η1α
j1 + η2α
j2); ηi ∈ GF (q) be a line in PG(m, q), then for all
0 ≤ i < n, αiF is also a line in PG(m, q). The αiF is called the ith circular shift
of line F .
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Table 2. Parameters of the Projective Geometry
Parameters Value
Field GF (q)
Dimension m
No. of field’s elements that consist each
point
q − 1
No. of points n = q
m+1
−1
q−1
No. of lines
J = nγ
ρ
=
(qm+1−1)(qm−1)
(q−1)(q−1)(q+1)
No. of points in each line ρ = q + 1
No. of lines intersecting at each point γ = q
m
−1
q−1
No. of cyclic classes (even m) Nc,even =
qm−1
q2−1
No. of cyclic classes (odd m) Nc,odd =
q(qm−1−1)
q2−1
If m is even, all lines in PG(m, q) have primitive incident vector and parti-
tioned into Nc,even =
qm−1
q2−1 cyclic classes, where each cyclic class consists of n
lines. If m is odd, only J0 lines of PG(m, q) have primitive incident vector [19].
Jo =
q(qm+1 − 1)(qm−1 − 1)
(q2 − 1)(q − 1)
(8)
These incident vectors are partitioned into Nc,odd cyclic classes.
Nc,odd =
q(qm−1 − 1)
(q2 − 1)
(9)
Table 2 summarizes necessary information of the projective geometry.
In finite geometry, since there is exactly one line connecting two distinct
points, no two incident vectors have more than one non-zero elements in the
same location. As a result of this property, the girth of QC-LDPC codes based
on finite geometry is at least 6.
2.3 FG-QC-LDPC Codes
In our scheme we exploit a QC-LDPC code with one block row of the form
Hqc = [H0H1 . . . Hn0−1]. (10)
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In FG-QC-LDPC codes, as a subset of QC-LDPC codes, the first rows of the
circulant blocks are derived from incident vectors of a line in that geometry.
Thanks to the geometric construction, each line, and therefore its incident vector,
can be identified by only two points lying on that line. This property helps us
to shorten the key size. Other details regarding the key size are mentioned in
Section 4.
The number of circulant blocks in the parity check matrix, n0, is limited to
the number of cyclic classes in that particular geometry, i.e. n0 ≤ Nc. The parity
check matrix derived from finite geometry has the following characteristics, which
correspond to the parameters given in Tables 1 and 2.
– The Hamming weight of each row in each circulant block is equal to the
number of points lying on each line in that finite geometry.
– The size of each circulant block is p×p, where p is the total number of points
in that geometry.
– No two columns have more than one common locations of 1s. This is due
to the fact that two distinct lines in finite geometry are either disjoint or
intersect at only one point.
– The Tanner graph contains no length 4 cycles.
– The codeword length is n = n0 × p.
– The length of message vectors or equally the dimension of the code is k =
(n0 − 1)× p = k0 × p.
3 FG-QC-LDPC Joint Encryption-Encoding Scheme
Here is the description of the proposed joint encryption-encoding scheme based
on FG-QC-LDPC codes in three different steps, that is, key generation, encryption-
encoding, and decryption-decoding. Then, we discuss the range of suitable pa-
rameters for our proposed scheme.
3.1 Key Generation
The secret key of the joint encryption-encoding scheme is composed of a parity
check matrix, H , a permutation matrix, P , and the seed of the Pseudo Random
Number Generator (PRNG).
Parity Check Matrix The parity check matrix of the FG-QC-LDPC code in
Eq.(10) can be constructed based on either Euclidean geometry or projective
geometry. The construction procedure first start with choosing between these
two types of geometries and their parameters. According to Section 2, a finite
geometry is defined in terms of two parameters, that is, its dimension, m, and
the corresponding field, GF (q).
As discussed in Section 2, in both cases of Euclidean and projective geome-
tries all lines are partitioned into different cyclic classes. Each cyclic class in a
finite geometry forms a set of rows of a circulant block. Thus, for generating a
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circulant block Hi one needs to simply specify a cyclic class and then assign only
its first row.
In the case of EG, the number of cyclic classes, according to the Table 1 is
Nc,EG∗ =
Jo
n =
qm−1−1
q−1 and the number of lines in each cyclic class is p = q
m−1
which is equal to the length of each row vector of circulant blocks.
In the case of PG, the number of cyclic classes is Nc,even =
qm−1
q2−1 or Nc,odd =
q(qm−1−1)
q2−1 , when the dimension of the geometry is even or odd, respectively.
Here, the number of lines in each cyclic class is p = q
m+1−1
q−1 .
To sum up with the generation of the parity check matrix, we should choose
public parameters, that is, the type of geometry, its dimension m, its correspond-
ing field GF (q), and the number of circulant blocks of the matrix, n0. Then each
circulant block must be generated in the above fashion.
Permutation Matrix In our scheme, the permutation matrix is a block diag-
onal matrix in the form of
P =


pi . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . pi


n0l×n0l
, (11)
where each pi block is an l × l permutation matrix.
The PRNG Seed In order to generate a sequence of perturbation vectors eP we
should utilize a PRNG. Thus, in order to use the same sequence as perturbation
vectors by the transmitter and the receiver, it suffices they agree on the same
seed for the PRNG. The sequence generated by the PRNG is then divided into
(n − k)-bit vectors, z. The perturbation vectors are computed by eP = H−1z,
where H−1 is the right inverse of H . Therefore, the perturbation vector eP is of
length n. Different PRNGs can be employed depending on the hardware/software
resources and applications of the joint encryption-encoding scheme.
3.2 Encryption-Encoding
For doing joint encryption-encoding, the transmitter needs to compute the gen-
erator matrix G from the parity check matrix H . In QC-LDPC codes with a
parity check matrix in the form of one block row (see Eq.(10)), the generator
matrix can be constructed as given below,
G =

Ik
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(H−1n0−1H0)
T
...
(H−1n0−1Hn0−2)
T

 . (12)
Note that for G being used as the generator matrix, it is sufficient for at least one
circulant block, Hi, to be non-singular. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the circulant block Hn0−1 is a non-singular matrix.
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed encryption-encoding / decryption-decoding
scheme.
Next, the transmitter generates a perturbation vector eP as given below,
eP = H
−1z, (13)
where z is an (n − k)-bit vector produced by the PRNG and the right inverse
of parity check matrix is computed through a public algorithm such as given in
[7].
Finally, the ciphertext is obtained as follows,
c = (mG+ eP )P (14)
3.3 Decryption-Decoding
We assume that the error vector e is added to the ciphertext through a noisy
channel between the transmitter and the receiver. Thus, we denote the received
vector by
r = c+ e = (mG+ ep)P + e. (15)
This algorithm works as follows:
1. Find the inverse permutation, P−1.
2. Multiply both sides of (15) by P−1.
r′ = rP−1 = mG+ ep + eP
−1 (16)
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3. Subtract the perturbation vector eP from r
′
c′ = r′ − eP = mG+ eP
−1 (17)
4. Decode c′ using a belief propagation algorithm to find m.
Note that the e′ = eP−1 has the same Hamming weight as e.
Fig. 1 shows block diagram of the joint encryption-encoding/decryption-
decoding algorithms.
3.4 The Code Parameters
To deploy a fitting EG-QC-LDPC or PG-QC-LDPC code, length, rate, and
density of the parity check matrix should be chosen properly. Our search results
reflect the parameter values for different codes and we have summarized some
suitable codes in Tables 3 and 4. Although parameters of any particular future
usage may need a value out of this range, we selected only those within the range
of existing standards as samples.
Code Rate The code rate of QC-LDPC codes with one block row is
R =
k
n
=
k0p
n0p
=
n0 − 1
n0
. (18)
In different communication standards, code rates vary from 1/5 in DVB-S2 [20]
to 14/15 in IEEE 802.15.3c [21].
Code Length The code lengths of EG-QC-LDPC and PG-QC-LDPC are as
follows using the parameters of Tables 1 and 2:
nEG = n0pEG = n0(q
m − 1), (19)
nPG = n0pPG = n0(
qm+1 − 1
q − 1
). (20)
Similarly, code lengths in different standards bound our search for suitable pa-
rameters from 336 bits in ITU-T G9960 [22] to 64800 bits in DVB-S2 [20].
Parity Check Matrix Density A parity check matrix of density 0.01 or lower
is categorized as a low density parity check matrix. LDPC codes of density about
0.001 have better error performance [23]. The density of the parity check matrices
of EG-QC-LDPC and PG-QC-LDPC codes are given below, respectively,
rEG =
ρ
p
=
q
qm − 1
(21)
rPG =
ρ
p
=
q + 1
qm+1−1
q−1
=
q2 − 1
qm+1 − 1
(22)
where ρ is the Hamming weight of the incident vector of each line in the geometry
and p is its length.
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4 Security and Performance
In order to evaluate a joint encryption-encoding scheme, also known as a secure
channel coding scheme, we investigate the scheme from security and efficiency
perspectives, namely, key size, error performance, and complexity of the scheme.
Our goal in design of the FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme is
to decrease the key size as well as complexity of the scheme while improving
error performance in comparison with the so far best previous schemes in the
literature. In addition, keeping it secure against all known cryptanalytic attacks.
4.1 Security
Provable security for symmetric key cryptography is an open problem. There
exists no natural hard problem that the security of the symmetric scheme can
be reduced to. By the way, to examine symmetric schemes there is a method to
reduce the security of that scheme to the problem of distinguishing between an
oracle which encrypts a message with a random key and an oracle which outputs
a random ciphertext [24]. This reduction in oracle model for chosen-plaintext
attack on symmetric key cryptosystems is given in [25], which is applicable to
analyze the security of modes of operations using a secure block cipher. Besides,
Menezes in his talk argued against the role of provable security as a real “proof”.
He claimed that provable security is a “tool” and old-fashioned cryptanalysis is
more reasonable in practical point of view [26].
Based on the level of a priori knowledge, which is available to the cryptana-
lyst, there are different classes of cryptanalyses. We have examined our scheme
against brute-force, ciphertext-only, message resend, and chosen-plaintext at-
tacks.
Brute-Force Attack The secret key consists of the parity check matrix, H, the
permutation matrix, P, and the seed of the PRNG, S. Each of these parameters
must be chosen large enough in order to keep our scheme secure against brute-
force attacks.
The number of parity check matrices of FG-QC-LDPC codes is
NFG = p
n0−1 ×
Nc!
(Nc − n0)!
, (23)
where Nc is the number of cyclic classes on that geometry. Let s denotes the
desired security parameter of our scheme, then in the Eq.(23) we can simply
assign the number of blocks, n0, and the block size, p, in such a way that satisfy
NFG > 2
s. Considering this constraint as well as those described in Section
3.4, our search for parameters of the suitable codes resulted various examples
summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
For the permutation matrix, its block size, l, must be chosen as great as l! >
2s condition holds. With this in mind, the block length can be kept considerably
short. Giving an example, if l ≥ 33 then l! > 2120.
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Table 3. Parameters of EG-QC-LDPC Codes Designed for the Proposed Scheme
n0 q m p Nc n R r log2(NEG)
4 5 6 15624 781 62496 0.75 0.0003 80.22
5 3 8 6560 1093 32800 0.80 0.0005 101.18
6 2 8 255 127 1530 0.8333 0.0078 81.73
6 3 6 728 121 4368 0.8333 0.0041 88.87
7 7 4 2400 57 16800 0.8571 0.0029 107.65
8 2 9 511 255 4088 0.8750 0.0039 126.78
9 2 10 1023 511 9207 0.8889 0.0020 160.86
15 2 10 1023 511 15345 0.9333 0.0020 274.64
Table 4. Parameters of PG-QC-LDPC Codes Designed for the Proposed Scheme
n0 q m p Nc n R r log2(NPG)
5 4 6 5461 273 27305 0.8000 0.0009 90.07
6 2 8 511 85 3066 0.8333 0.0059 83.18
6 2 9 1023 170 6138 0.8333 0.0029 94.32
8 3 6 1093 91 8744 0.8750 0.0037 122.26
11 2 8 511 85 5621 0.9091 0.0059 159.50
13 5 5 3906 130 50778 0.9231 0.0015 233.57
15 3 7 3280 273 49200 0.9333 0.0012 284.34
For the PRNG, the length of the seed must simply be chosen larger than the
security parameter, s.
Ciphertext-Only Attack The goal of this attack is to recover the plaintext
from its ciphertext without any knowledge of the key. In code-based cryptosys-
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tems, this is interpreted as decoding a coded message without access to its parity
check or generator matrices. To achieve this goal, the adversary needs to solve
the general decoding problem, which is known to be NP-hard problem [2]. This
cryptanalysis was applied on the McEliece-like public-key code-based cryptosys-
tems [27,28,29], whose public generator matrix is algebraically equivalent to their
secret key generator matrix. Since in our symmetric key code-based schemes the
parity-check matrix is kept secret, this attack is not feasible on our scheme in
polynomial time.
Message Resend Attack The aim of the message resend attack is to find the
perturbation vector, eP , used by the transmitter and then recover the message
in the following manner. Suppose that the transmitter sends c1 = (mG+ eP1)P
to the receiver. The attacker, as the man in the middle, alter some bits of c1 such
that the receiver receives a false or undecodable vector. Therefore, the receiver
has to make a request to the transmitter for resending the message, m. This
time, the transmitter encrypts the same message using a different perturbation
vector eP2, as c2 = (mG + eP2)P . This scenario is called message resend [30].
In this situation, the attacker has access to two different ciphertexts c1 and c2
of the same message m. So the attacker can obtain the following equation and
thereby guessing the positions of non-zero entries of eP1 and eP2.
c1 + c2 = (eP1 + eP2)P (24)
This attack is only feasible when the perturbation vectors have low Hamming
weight. Since the used perturbation vectors in the proposed scheme are generated
uniformly at random, it is not feasible to find each of eP1 and eP2 from c1 + c2.
Moreover, the secret permutation matrix, P , changes the location of 1s and 0s.
Apart from these issues while applying this attack, error correction capability
of capacity approaching FG-QC-LDPC codes could obviate the need for resend-
ing the message. Because the alterations made by the attacker can be recovered
by the error correction code. Thus, the message resend scenario does not occur.
Chosen-Plaintext Attack There are two major chosen-plaintext attack sce-
narios against secret key code-based cryptosystems, namely Struik-Tilburg [5]
and Rao-Nam [31] attacks.
Struick-Tilburg Attack Struik and Tilburg [5] proposed a chosen-plaintext attack
against secret-key code-based cryptosystems. In this attack two plaintexts m1
and m2 are chosen in a way that they are only different on their i
th position, i.e.
m1 −m2 = ui. As a result, the corresponding ciphertext difference is
c1 − c2 = uiGP + (eP1 − eP2)P = g
′
i + (eP1 − eP2)P, (25)
where g′i is the i
th row of the generator matrix G′ = GP . The attacker will
repeat the procedure for the same ui and different perturbation vectors ep until
a set of all possible ciphertexts of ui are collected. The cardinality of this set is
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equal to the number of total perturbation vectors, Ne. Doing a brute-force over
all perturbation vectors, g′i is obtained. Repeating the above scenario for all i
reveals the whole matrix G′.
The work factor of this attack is of Ω(knN2e log2(Ne)) [31]. Therefore, this at-
tack will be successful only if the set of all perturbation vectors,Ne, has small car-
dinality. In FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme Ne = 2
(n−k) = 2p
and according to Tables 3 and 4, min(p) = 255. So the work factor of this attack
is of Ω(1275× 1530× 2510 × 255), which is dramatically large and therefore the
Struik-Tilburg attack is not applicable to the FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-
encoding scheme in polynomial time.
Rao-Nam Attack Rao and Nam [31] proposed their attack based on the previ-
ously mentioned Struik-Tilburg [5] attack. They similarly used chosen-plaintexts
m1 and m2 differing only in one position. They noticed that when the perturba-
tion vectors has low Hamming distance the the attacker can use majority voting
to estimate g′i and thereby revealing the whole matrix G
′. The work factor of
this attack, obtained by Rao and Nam [31], is Ω(Nke ). Based on Table 3 and 4,
The minimum work factor of this attack on our proposed scheme is Ω(2551275).
Therefore, the FG-QC-LDPC joint scheme is far more secure to be threatened
by this attack.
4.2 Key Size
The secret key of the FG-QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme as men-
tioned in Section 3.1 consists of the seed vector for a PRNG (S), the parity check
matrix (H), and the permutation matrix (P ).
|Ks| = |S|+ |KP |+ |KH | (26)
First, choosing a suitable PRNG for each application, keeps the size of the
seed at a desirable extent. Comparing PRNGs is not in the scope of this paper.
However, as pointed in Section 1, it is not recommended to use simple LFSRs
based on the reasons mentioned in [13]. In our example, we use Sosemanuk-128
stream cipher as an example of PRNG [32]. The size of the seed vector of this
PRNG is only 128 bits.
Owing to quasi-cyclic structure of the parity check matrix, storing only the
first row of each circulant block of this matrix suffices to create the parity check
matrix. Furthermore, thanks to the finite geometry construction of these blocks,
the whole first row of each block can be produced by only knowing the location
of two “1”s on each. Since each row is an incident vector of a line on finite
geometry, the two “1”s indicate the two points where a line go through them.
Thus, these two location numbers can regenerate the line and its incident vector.
We introduce a practical method to achieve the information theoretic lower
bound for storing the first row of each circulant block. In this regard, we need
to identify two things, the representative of cyclic class and the number of cyclic
right shift to obtain the first row. The following constraints must be considered
to assign a unique line as a representative for each cyclic class.
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Table 5. The key size of the proposed system with 80 bits security parameter
Secret key
parts
Proposed
parameters
Computational
complexity to find
key
Key
size
H q = 3,m = 6, n0 = 6 2
88.87 92 bits
P l = 26 288.38 99 bits
S Sosemanuk-128 > 280
128
bits
Total Key size 319
bits
i) The first element of its incident vector must be “1”.
ii) The next “1” in the incident vector must be located at the nearest possible
locations among all lines of the class.
If the non-zero elements of the incident vector of the representative are αj1 , αj2 , . . . , αjρ
, (i) forces that j1 = 0 and (ii) forces j2 − j1 < min (ji+1 − ji), (j1 − jρ)(mod p).
By using this method we only store j2 to indicate the cyclic class. This needs
only ⌈log2(
p
ρ)⌉ bits. Another ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits is needed to indicate the amount of
cyclic shift for the first row of each block. As a result, the amount of memory to
store each circulant block of FG-QC-LDPC parity check matrix is
⌈log2(
p
ρ
)⌉+ ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits. (27)
While a permutation in the rows of the parity check matrix makes no difference
in the code, we can suppose that the first circulant block (or one of the others)
made by the representative without being cyclically shifted. As a result, the
whole parity check matrix with one block row and n0 blocks needs the following
amount of memory to be stored.
|KH | = n0 × ⌈log2(
p
ρ
)⌉+ (n0 − 1)× ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits (28)
The block diagonal permutation matrix, P , in this scheme will be stored in
similar way as in [6]. The size of the permutation matrix of the key is as follows.
Where l is the length of each block and l′ = 2⌊log2(l)⌋.
|KP | = l(log2 l
′ + 1)− 2l′ + 1 (29)
Tables 5 and 6 show examples of codes and their key sizes for 80 bits and
120 bits security parameters, respectively.
The key size of the proposed scheme, taking the advantages of FG-QC-LDPC
codes, decreases to 319 bits where the key size of the last known similar system
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Table 6. The key size of the proposed system with 120 bits security parameter
Secret key
parts
Proposed
parameters
Computational
complexity to find
key
Key
size
H q = 3,m = 6, n0 = 8 2
121.56 126
bits
P l = 52 2225.58
249
bits
S Sosemanuk-128 > 2120
128
bits
Total Key size 503
bits
Table 7. Comparison of the key size of the proposed scheme with the preceding schemes
Cryptosystem Code Key size
Rao[3] C(1024,524) 2 Mbits
Rao-Nam[31] C(72,64) 18 Kbits
Struik-Tilburg[5] C(72,64) 18 Kbits
Barbero-Ytrehus[6] C(30,20) over GF (28) 4.9 Kbits
Sobhi Afshar, et
al.[7]
C(2044,1024) 2.5 Kbits
Hooshmand, et al.[8] C(2470,2223) 3.55 Kbits
Esmaeili, et al.[9] C(2048,1536) 2191 bits
Esmaeili,
Gulliver[10]
C(2048,1536) 2272 bits
Mafakheri, et al.[14] C(2048,1781) 1611 bits
The proposed
scheme
C(4368,3640) 319 bits
was 2272 bits [10]. Table 7 compares the key size of the proposed system with
those known similar systems.
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Fig. 2. Performance comparison of log-SPA decoder of 10 and 100 iterations with
Reed-Solomon code.
4.3 Error Performance
At the receiver the FG-QC-LDPC code used in our system is decoded by a
logarithmic Sum-Product decoder. We took the following considerations to sim-
ulate encoding, channel, and decoding processes. In our simulation codewords
transmitted via a Quadratic Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) channel with additive
white Gaussian noise. The receiver has access to soft information of channel. We
compared decoders of 10 and 100 iterations with a Reed-Solomon code in Fig.
2. This figure shows that there is no remarkable improvement in 100 iterations
decoding in compare to 10 iterations.
4.4 Complexity
There are two separate process which their computational complexity needs to
be assessed, encryption-encoding and decryption-decoding processes.
Encryption-Encoding The complexity of this process can be calculated as
follows.
CEnc = Cmul(mG) + Cadd(mG+ eP ) + (30)
Cmul(H
−1.s) + Cmul(P )
In this equation Cadd(mG + eP ) stands for adding two n-bit vectors which
consume n binary operations. Multiplying a vector by a sparse matrix a1nBnn,
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needs nw binary operations [33], where w is the Hamming weight of rows of the
sparse matrix. Here permutation matrix, P , has w = 1 so Cmul(P ) = n.
The generator matrix, G, and the inverse of parity check matrix, H−1, are
dense matrices and need kn and (n− k)n binary operations respectively. By the
way, their quasi cyclic property leads to a 92% lower computational complexity
in multiplying operations [33]. Therefor, we can conclude that:
CEnc = 0.08× k.n+ n+ 0.08× (n− k).n+ n (31)
=
0.08n+ 2
R
,
where R = kn .
Decryption-Decoding The complexity of this process is obtained as follow.
CDec = Cmul(r × P
−1) + Cadd(r
′ + eP ) (32)
Cmul(H
−1s) + Cmul(c
′ ×HT ) + CSPA
The complexity of the Sum-Product Algorithm, as mentioned in [33], is
CSPA = Iavg.n[d(8ρ+ 12R− 11) + ρ]. (33)
In this equation Iavg is the average number of decoding iterations and d is
the number of quantization bits in analog-to-digital converter. Finally letting
Iavg = 10 and d = 6, the number of binary operations for each information bit
to be decrypted-decoded is
CDec/k =
1
R
(2 + n− k + n0ρ+ 490ρ+ 720R− 110). (34)
In this equation it is obvious that the complexity of decryption-decoding algo-
rithm is linearly proportional to the redundancy (n− k).
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a joint encryption-encoding scheme, also known as secure
channel coding, using QC-LDPC codes based on finite geometry. We have taken
advantage of FG-QC-LDPC codes to shorten the secret key to 20% of that of
the previously best known similar systems.
Thanks to the LDPC codes and their fast iterative decoding, the error per-
formance of the proposed scheme is among the best of the literature. The FG-
QC-LDPC joint encryption-encoding scheme is secure against cryptanalyses of
such cryptosystems.
The joint algorithm leads to lower complexity than conventional encryption-
then-encoding methods. We have shown that our system can provide reliability
and security simultaneously with the lower cost of one joint system rather than
two disjoint systems.
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